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ABSTRACT 
The Nash equilibrium of a class of games generated from a market is examined. 
Demands are assumed linear, and production constraints are imposed. The equi- 
librium is shown to be solvable as a complementarity problem. If the demand matrix is 
a positive definite symmetric z-matrix, then the Nash equilibrium is stable. If the 
demand matrix is not symmetric, an additional condition yielding stability is devel- 
oped. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the Nash equilibrium of a game generated from an economic 
market. In this market there are n firms, with firm i having ki products. The 
demands for all products are interrelated and are a linear function of all 
prices. Further, the volumes of each firm are constrained by a set of linear 
inequalities. 
In this paper we present stability results for the Nash equilibrium for this 
class of games. Stability of a solution for a game drawn from a market is 
important because it implies the equilibrium is realizable. A solution that can 
be reached through a “rational” process of adjustment increases the utility of 
that solution. 
Given a payoff function for each player, qi( xi,. . . , xi,. . . x,), as a function 
of each player’s strategy vector xi, the Nash equilibrium is defined to be x0 
such that 
for all players i, with yi in player i’s strategy set. 
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For this paper we will make some additional assumptions about the 
model. Let p be the vector of prices, o the vector of volumes, e the vector of 
costs. The vectors pi, ui, e, will denote the restrictions to the k i products made 
by firm i. We assume that costs are not volume dependent and that all 
volumes are related to all prices linearly, or 
u=uo -A(p-%). 
So far this is a standard development. Now we impose additional con- 
straints on each firm in the form of linear constraints on volume, represented 
by 
Qiui adi. 
Such constraints are pertinent for modeling nonnegativity of volumes, re- 
source availability, or regulatory rules. 
The payoff function cpi( ) for firm i is the profit for that firm and is given 
by 
(pi -ei)Tui. 
To find the Nash equilibrium we solve n constrained optimization prob- 
lems to find all firms’ maximum profit policies. The Nash equilibrium is the 
intersection of these policies. 
Rewriting with price as the only variable, each firm’s objective becomes 
ma (Pi -eiJTIUoi --A(P-Po)] 
s*t* Qi[uoi -Ai(P-PO)] “di, 
pi 20. 
Ai represents the restriction of the demand matrix pertaining to firm i. 
Because each firm has control of its own prices and profits depend upon all 
firms’ prices, we decompose A into B - C. B is block diagonal (containing n 
blocks) with block i representing the change in firm i ‘s demands as a function 
of the change in firm i ‘s price. C represents the changes in all firms’ demands 
as a function of competitors’ price changes. As elsewhere, Bi, C, represent the 
restrictions of B, C to firm i, so that 
Ai=Bi -Ci. 
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Note that this implies that for each ami EA, 
i-l 
b 
a .= mf 
if xk,&k, 
ml I=1 I=1 
-%i otherwise. 
Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for each firm yields 
(Bi +BT-Ci)p-B:Qpi -l-q =vi, 
/.L~ =Q,A,p--K;, Pi>vi>AiVPiao 
p;vi =o, 
/lpi =o, 
Ki =Biei +oio +AipO, 
K; =d, -Qivio -QiAip,,. 
Synthesizing for n firms gives 
[ 
B+BT-C 
QA 
-",'""][g-K=[;] 
with 
Q=[ Qi .*,I, K=[;;], 
p*v=o, j.Fh=o, p, v, II, x20. 
Thus we see that a constrained quadratic market game can be written as a 
complementarity problem. We point out that this formulation varies from 
standard situations that can be written as complementarity problems. It is 
neither a single player quadratic optimization nor a polymatti noncoopera- 
tive ‘game. In fact, the formulation below more closely resembles a linear- 
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quadratic differential game stripped of its dynamics with constraints added: 
W=MX+q, WTX=O, w, xao, 
B+BT-- -;‘Q , 
QA I [I 
x= 1 ) 9=-[K]. 
2. STABILITY RESULTS 
An equilibrium point of a market generated game that cannot be reached 
by a sequence of decisions by “rational’ players is of dubious value. This is 
especially true if the players are not knowledgeable in game theory. We say 
that an equilibrium is stable if, from any initial point, the sequence of prices 
obtained by successively maximizing profits based on previous prices con- 
verges to the Nash equilibrium. One can investigate sequential price changes 
and develop similar results. 
Stability results have been investigated for noncooperative games in many 
places. Generally, constrained problems are not directly considered. An 
exception is Rosen [2], who uses a differential equations approach. Here we 
use a discrete updating process. While Rosen’s method can be discretized so 
that it reduces to a steepest descent method of reaching the Nash equilibrium, 
we are interested in methods based on profit maximization for each firm. 
Others, Williams for instance [4], treat stability in more general contexts 
but require stronger hypotheses. Generally, variants of diagonal dominance 
conditions are used. 
More recently [5] Moulin and Gabay considered the Nash equilibrium 
when the players have nonlinear utility functions. They formulate the prob- 
lem as a nonlinear complementarity problem, but the players’ strategies are 
unconstrained. Local stability is proven under the assumption of diagonal 
dominance of the Jacobian of the players’ utility functions. See [6] for a 
discussion of situations where the Nash equilibrium is not stable. 
In this paper we seek conditions on the demand matrix A, rather than on 
the complementarity matrix M. While it would be easier to postulate hypothe- 
ses such as diagonal dominance for M, this would add little insight and not 
necessarily be backed by economic motivation. Thus this work diverges from 
other papers on stability in its search for conditions and in its inclusion of 
constraints. We exploit the special structure of this problem to develop 
conditions on A insuring stability. 
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We assume that A is positive definite and a z-matrix throughout. (That A 
is a *matrix means that its diagonal elements are positive and off diagonal 
elements are nonpositive.) The assumption that A is a z-matrix is often 
reasonable, since it implies that a price increase in any product will decrease 
demand for that product and not decrease demand for all other products. 
Positive definiteness is also useful, for it denies the possibility of a ray of 
prices increasing arbitrarily without reducing demand of some products. 
Given a set of prices pa, define 
--Tp] and C=[&j, 
where Q is the set of active constraints of Qv 2 b when each firm maximizes 
profits assuming prices pO for all other firms. For a given set of binding 
constraints Q and given price vector pi we calculate pi + r by 
- Pi+1 
B ‘i+l [ 1 = -K+Cpi, 
or 
pi+1 
[ I ‘i+l =B-‘Cpi --B-‘K. 
Kis defined similarly from K by dropping inactive constraints. 
To prove the desired results we invoke a theorem of Varga [4]. 
THEOREM [4]. Let L=M-N, where M is block diagonal and N is 
nonnegative. If L, M are M-matrices (M -l, N -’ >O), then I( M -‘N II < 1. 
When g= B + BT, c= C, then we have an immediate proof of stability of 
the Nash equilibrium of the unconstrained problem. 
COROLLARY. Zf there are no constraints and A = B - C, then the sequence 
of prices generated by pi+l =&‘cp, -B-‘Kcmverges. 
Proof. To apply Varga’s result we need only show that B+ BT and 
A+BT are M-matrices. By our assumption A is positive definite and C 
nonnegative. Since B is also a z-matrix and each Bj is a principal minor of A, 
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each Bi is positive definite. So B is positive definite. It follows that A+ BT, 
B+ BT are also positive definite. Thus they are *matrices with positive 
principal minors and are thus M-matrices [l]. Therefore ll(B+BT)-lCll <l, 
and the sequence of prices converges to the Nash equilibrium. n 
Dealing with constraints requires slightly more subtlety. First we prove 
two lemmas which imply contractivity of l?rcfrom conditions on A. Then 
we wiIl show that contractivity of @‘I? for alI possible sets of active 
constraints is sufficient to obtain convergence of the best response mapping. 
LEMMA 1. Let B be symmetric, and let 0 be the reduced matrix f&n a 
set of active constraints. Let 
Then for suitable choice of scaling for Q, II @%ll< 1. 
Proof 
from symmetry. Let u = BTp; then uT = QB and uTB -’ = @ Now 
g-1 = 
I 
B(B-1_B-lU(~TB-12()-1UTB--1) B-lu(UTB-lU)-l 
-(UTB-lU)-lUT~-l 
I 
~(u~B-~u)-~ ’ 
g-q 
= 
I 
~(Z-FB-~U(U~B--IU)-~U~)B-~C 
I (u~B-%)-~u~)B-~c * 
Now B-1u(~TB-1u)-1~T(B-1~(~TB-1~)-1~T=B-1~(~TB-1~)-1~T, so 
it is a projection (denoted by P) and II B -‘u(~~B-~u)-~u~ II = 1. Finally we 
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can scale u to make Il(uTB-‘u)-‘uTll<~. Thus, 
(~B-‘qq~z+q IIB-‘q + (((urB-124-q J(B-‘q. 
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From the previous corollary 11 B-lC 11 ‘P<l, so 
LEMMA 2. Zf B- $C is positive definite, then II ~-‘cll -C 1. 
PTOO~ Let B, =;(B+BT). Then 
Again scale u so that 
- 
II ( 
uTBs-‘u) -‘u%- ‘C+2(uTB,-‘u)-‘uTB-‘CI[ <E. 
In the upper part of the matrix, 
B,%( u*B,-~u) -la* 
is a projection. Rewriting this part gives 
By hypothesis B - ;C is positive definite, as is B; thus both are M-matrices. 
From Theorem 1, IJB-‘$CI/<l and IIB-‘CII<$. B, is positive definite, 
so we need only show that B, - 2C is positive definite: 
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if x#O. Thus IIB-‘CII <$ by the same argument. Having shown tinis, we 
now can show B -“C is a contraction: 
(I~(z-P)B,-~c+PB-~c~~c~((~-~~( IIBs?C\I + IPII IP-‘CII 
<&(l)@)++=l. 
The remaining steps of the argument are as before. 
DEFINITION The best response mapping R(p) is given by 
XhT(QBp-K’-QCp,)=O, p, X20). 
THEOREM. Zf B - 2 C is positive definite or if B is symmetric, R(p) is a 
contraction. Hence, the set of prices will converge to the Nash equilibrium. 
Proof. For a given p, some set of constraints p will be active. Thus, 
R(p,)=B-‘Cp, -B-‘K in some range. R(p) is then a piecewise Linear 
mapping. We wish to show that II&p)--R(q)ll<JJp-911. Without loss of 
generality assume that p, 9 he on adjacent regions. R is linear on each region; 
hence it is a contraction on each region, by the previous lemmas. Let 
z=ap+(l-a)9 with R(p)-R(z) linear and R(x)-R(9) linear. Then 
This proves the contractivity of R(p). n 
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